Podcast brief
Rebecca Lowe on the Three Ways Speech Can Be Unfree
Rebecca Lowe talks with the host about a framework for identifying the different ways someone can fail to speak freely.
A Stoa brief of an episode from Elucidations
Episode 155: Rebecca Lowe discusses speaking freely
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The episode belongs to its makers. This page summarizes its arguments in Stoa's words and points to the moments where they are made. Brief updated .
The brief
Rebecca Lowe argues that the best way to understand what it means to speak freely is to catalog the different ways a person can fail to do so, rather than trying to define the positive phenomenon head on. She sets out three types of constraint: lacking the personal capacity to utter words or to determine their content, lacking the opportunity to communicate despite having that capacity, and having both capacity and opportunity but holding back because of an expected bad consequence.
The reasoning behind this taxonomy is structural. Lowe argues that the second and third types are parasitic on the first: you can only be denied an opportunity to speak, or deterred by consequences, if you already have the underlying capacity to utter words and determine their content. This dependency does real work. It lets Lowe correct conflations, such as treating deplatforming as equivalent to physical silencing, or a friend's claim that believing in free will means state constraints on speech do not really count. For Lowe, that friend mixes up a Type 1 question about personal capacity with a Type 3 question about consequences, and something bad is still happening when a state fines someone for what they say.
A further thread complicates the popular idea that speaking freely tracks speaking truthfully. Lowe argues the two are not tightly linked. A teacher who must stay on topic, or a doctor who must withhold part of a diagnosis, shows that true speech can be permissibly constrained, and that truthfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for a constraint to be wrong. She extends this into coercion, arguing that even a blackmailed statement someone actually wants to make involves a wrong, because their reasoning process was interfered with rather than freely exercised.
The strongest tension in the conversation is where this leaves enforcement. Lowe resists handing these judgments to law, which she calls too blunt an instrument for the fine distinctions her framework draws, and argues instead for the harder, ongoing work of moral reasoning between people. That leaves an open question for the reader: before calling in an authority over an offensive remark, what would it look like to address it directly instead.
Strongest arguments
Three types of failing to speak freely
4:36Rebecca Lowe distinguishes Type 1, a lack of personal capacity to utter words or determine their content, Type 2, a lack of opportunity to communicate despite having that capacity, and Type 3, having both capacity and opportunity but refraining because of an expected bad consequence. She presents this as a descriptive toolkit rather than an exhaustive theory.
The types are hierarchically dependent
9:53Lowe argues that Type 2 and Type 3 constraints are parasitic on Type 1 capacity: you can only be prevented from communicating in a chosen way, or inhibited by consequences, if you already have the capacity to utter words and determine their content. She uses this to show why a friend's claim that belief in free will makes state speech constraints meaningless conflates a Type 1 and Type 3 issue.
The capacity to determine content grounds moral status
12:51Lowe grounds the seriousness of speech constraints in the idea that the capacity to utter words and determine their content is central to moral agency and status. Constraining this capacity is not just inconvenient but undermines part of what makes someone a free, morally responsible agent.
Truthfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for permissible constraint
22:59Lowe argues against the common assumption that constraining true speech is always impermissible and that speaking freely and speaking truthfully are tightly linked. She gives examples, a teacher obligated to stay on topic despite saying true things, and a doctor who must sometimes withhold a false-seeming diagnosis, to show the relationship is not clear cut.
Coercion cases reveal the difference between wanting and freely determining
31:00Lowe distinguishes between saying what one first-order wants to say and freely determining what to say. In blackmail cases, even if the coerced statement matches what someone wants, something is still wrong because the reasoning process producing the utterance was interfered with, as in the case of a blackmailed inheritance decision.
Moral evaluation of speech constraints requires further questions
37:07Beyond the three types, Lowe proposes a checklist of questions, including who has the authority to intervene, whether the intervention itself is a permissible action, and what the intention behind it is, to determine whether a given constraint is bad, wrong, or permissible.
Over-delegating speech judgments to law degrades society
34:57Lowe argues that individuals and communities should do the hard work of making fine-grained moral judgments about speech themselves rather than calling in police or courts, because law is too blunt an instrument for these distinctions and because failing to engage with each other about these matters is itself a loss.
Disagreements
Whether belief in free will nullifies state speech constraints
10:29Lowe recounts a friend arguing that because they believe in free will, the state can never really constrain their speech. Lowe disagrees, arguing this conflates a Type 1 issue of personal capacity with a Type 3 issue of state-imposed consequences, and that something bad is still happening when the state fines someone for speaking.
Concepts discussed
- free will The capacity of an agent to choose or will among alternatives in a way that grounds moral responsibility.
Questions this episode answers
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What are the different ways someone can fail to speak freely?
4:36Rebecca Lowe distinguishes three types: lacking the personal capacity to utter words or determine their content, lacking the opportunity to communicate despite having that capacity, and having both capacity and opportunity but refraining due to an expected bad consequence.
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Is speaking truthfully necessary for a speech constraint to be wrong?
22:59Lowe argues no, using examples like a teacher who must stay on topic despite saying true things and a doctor who must sometimes give an incomplete diagnosis, concluding that truthfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for a constraint's impermissibility.
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Why is being coerced into saying something you actually want to say still morally wrong?
31:00Lowe argues that speaking freely means uttering what you have decided to say through your own reasoning process, not merely what matches your first-order desire, so even if a coerced statement aligns with your wants, interference with your reasoning process is still a wrong, illustrated through a blackmail inheritance case.
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Why might delegating disputes about offensive speech to the police be a mistake?
34:57Lowe argues that law is too blunt an instrument for making fine-grained moral distinctions about speech, and that individuals and communities should do the harder work themselves, using examples of calling police over a sexist joke or a scientifically wrong lecture instead of addressing it directly.
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How does the capacity to determine the content of your words relate to moral status?
12:51Lowe argues that the capacity to utter words and determine their content is central to being a free, morally responsible agent, so being deprived of this capacity is a serious wrong that goes beyond mere inconvenience.