Question
How do you deal with difficult people at work as a Stoic?
Learn how Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius handle office rivals, backstabbers, and irritating colleagues without pretending they are not difficult.
Updated
The short answer
Stoicism does not tell you to tolerate a difficult coworker or suppress your irritation. It tells you that their bad behavior comes from their own false judgments about what is good, and that it cannot actually damage your character unless you let it. You still act to do your job well and to push back where needed, but you stop treating their opinion or obstruction as an injury to who you are.
Key points
- Marcus Aurelius rehearses the difficult people he expects to meet each day so their behavior does not surprise him.
- Both Epictetus and Marcus argue that a wrongdoer acts from ignorance or a false impression of their own duty, so the deception harms them, not you.
- Your reputation and other people's opinions are not up to you, so a colleague's bad judgment of you is not an actual loss.
- A difficult person can obstruct a specific action, but the Stoics argue the mind can turn that obstacle into material for acting well.
- This is not passivity: you still pursue your proper acts, you just separate the outcome, which is not fully up to you, from your own judgment and effort, which are.
- Marcus grounds the practice in a claim that people are built for cooperation, so anger and withdrawal work against that design.
The longer answer
Marcus starts many of his mornings, as recorded in Meditations, by rehearsing the people he is about to meet: "the busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial" (Meditations 2.1). This is not resignation. He is preparing his judgment in advance, so that when the difficult colleague shows up, he is not caught off guard and does not mistake their behavior for something aimed at him personally.
The common misreading is that Stoicism tells you to tolerate bad behavior, keep your head down, and let it go for the sake of inner peace. That is not the argument. The Stoic claim is sharper: the difficult person cannot actually harm the part of you that matters, so there is nothing to brace against in the first place. Marcus gives the reason. People act badly "by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil" (Meditations 2.1). They think their behavior serves some good, even when it doesn't. Epictetus makes the same point from the other side: when someone harms you or speaks badly of you, "he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty," following what seems right to him, not to you (Handbook 42). If he is following a false impression, he is the one damaged by it, "since he too is the person deceived" (Handbook 42). Your reputation, in the technical Stoic sense, is not yours to lose to another person's bad judgment. It was never up to you in the first place (Handbook 1).
This changes what you are protecting at work. If you think a rude coworker or a scheming manager can genuinely injure you, you will spend your energy managing your anxiety about them, rehearsing arguments, losing sleep. Marcus argues this is confused. He describes people who "make themselves obstacles to my proper acts" as becoming, in that respect, indifferent to him, no different from bad weather (Meditations 5.20). They can obstruct a specific action. They cannot touch his disposition, "which have the power of acting conditionally and changing." He goes further: the mind converts a hindrance to action into an aid, so that "which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this road" (Meditations 5.20). A colleague who blocks your plan gives you a new problem to solve well, which is itself an exercise in the excellence you were trying to build anyway.
None of this means passivity. Marcus is explicit that he still has "proper acts," things he is trying to do, and difficult people can genuinely impede those. The Stoic response is not to stop pursuing your work but to hold two things apart: the external outcome, which is not fully up to you, and your own judgment, effort, and reaction, which are (Handbook 1). You still act, propose, correct, and even push back. You just do it without the added and unnecessary conviction that their opinion of you, or their obstruction of your plan, is an injury to your character.
There is also a social dimension that is easy to miss. Marcus reminds himself that people are "made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids" (Meditations 2.1), and that turning away from a difficult colleague in anger works against that basic design. He is not asking you to like them. He is asking you to notice that your irritation and withdrawal are themselves an "acting against one another," which he calls contrary to nature (Meditations 2.1).
A workable version of this for an actual job: before a meeting with someone difficult, name to yourself what is up to you (your preparation, your tone, your judgment about what matters) and what is not (their mood, their agenda, whether they concede the point). Then go in without needing the second column to go your way.
Primary passages
Begin the morning by saying to yourself I shall meet with the busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.1 Read in context
Marcus rehearses the difficult people he will meet before he meets them, so their behavior does not catch him off guard.
When any person harms you, or speaks badly of you, remember that he acts or speaks from a supposition of its being his duty. Now, it is not possible that he should follow what appears right to you, but what appears so to himself. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong appearance, he is the person hurt, since he too is the person deceived.
Epictetus, Handbook 42 Read in context
Epictetus locates the damage in the wrongdoer's own false judgment, not in you.
I can neither be injured by any of them ... For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.1 Read in context
Marcus grounds patience with difficult people in a claim about human beings as naturally built for cooperation, not just personal invulnerability.
Some things are in our control and others not. Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, command, and, in one word, whatever are not our own actions.
Epictetus, Handbook 1 Read in context
The dichotomy of control behind this whole approach: your judgment and effort are yours, their opinion and cooperation are not.
Important distinctions
Tolerating bad behavior versus being unharmed by it
It looks like Stoic advice is to just put up with a difficult coworker for the sake of your own calm. Epictetus and Marcus are making a stronger and different claim: the coworker's bad opinion or bad conduct cannot touch your actual character, so there is nothing there to merely endure. You can still object, correct, or escalate. What changes is that you are not doing it from a wounded place.
The action versus the disposition
Marcus separates what a person can block, your specific plan or proper act, from what they cannot touch, your disposition and judgment. A difficult manager can delay your project. Marcus argues they cannot make your mind worse unless you let their obstruction convert into anger or despair.
Objections and replies
This sounds like it lets bad behavior off the hook
If the wrongdoer is just deceived and therefore already the one hurt, doesn't that let a manipulative or abusive coworker escape accountability, and doesn't it risk leaving you exposed to real harm at work, like being passed over or undermined?
Epictetus is diagnosing what is happening in the wrongdoer's mind, not recommending inaction. Marcus is explicit that some people obstruct his actual proper acts, and he treats that as a real problem to solve, not an illusion. The Stoic move is to still act, correct, escalate, or protect your position, but to do it without the added conviction that their opinion of you is itself an injury. Accountability and inner calm are not in tension here.
Isn't calling people ignorant just condescending
Saying a difficult colleague acts from ignorance of good and evil can sound like a way of dismissing them rather than actually understanding the situation.
Marcus applies the same diagnosis to himself elsewhere: everyone, including the reader, acts on partial and mistaken impressions much of the time. The point is not moral superiority. It is a claim about how anger works: you rarely stay calm around someone you think is acting from clear-eyed malice, but you can stay steady around someone you recognize as mistaken, the way you would with anyone who has bad information.
Practice this in Stoa
Guided courses in the Stoa app that put this into daily practice.
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Podcast discussions
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Ryan Holiday and Professor William O. Stephens discuss the illness, loss, and isolation behind Marcus Aurelius's final years and the writing of Meditations.
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Michael Trombley and Caleb examine classicist Emily Wilson's three criticisms of Epictetus and test whether they hold up against the Discourses and Handbook.
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Ryan Holiday narrates a solo 50-kilometer run past Rome's Stoic landmarks to draw out lessons about voluntary hardship and endurance.
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Stoic Premeditation and the Predictable Frustrations of Parenting
Ryan Holiday and psychologist Dr. Becky Kennedy connect the Stoic practice of premeditatio malorum to why parents are so often blindsided by ordinary child behavior.
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The Stoics vs. Plato: Blank Slate or Innate Ideas
Michael Tremblay and Caleb Ontiveros compare the Stoic view of the mind as a blank slate with Plato's theory of innate knowledge, and what each means for self-knowledge.
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Caleb Ontiveros on Why Stoic Happiness Must Be Up to Us
Caleb Ontiveros and Michael Tremblay lay out and stress-test the Stoic case that happiness must depend on us, not on the world.
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Related concepts, philosophers and works
Sources
- Epictetus, Handbook Primary text, Stoa library
- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations Primary text, Stoa library